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IN FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS
Poverenje u institucije 
u bivšim jugoslovenskim republikama
ABSTRACT: In this paper, we identify the main factors of confidence in institutions 
in the six former Yugoslav republics. Conceptually, we introduce two theoretical 
approaches: social capital theory and political approach. To test our hypotheses, 
we rely on European Value Study 2008 data, and we use OLS regression analysis. 
We conclude that the six countries are quite similar in terms of identified factors 
of confidence in institutions. Satisfaction with democracy proves to be the most 
reliable predictor of confidence in institutions in each country. Additionally, we 
conclude that social capital theory provides a better framework for explaining 
confidence in institutions, rather than the political approach.
KEY WORDS: institutions, European Value Study, social trust, OLS regression, 
former Yugoslavia.
APSTRAKT: Tema ovog članka jeste identifikacija ključnih faktora poverenja 
u institucije u šest država, bivših Jugoslovenskih republika. Članak se 
konceptualno oslanja na dva pristupa, i to su teorija o socijalnom kapitalu 
i politički pristup. Za testiranje hipoteza koristili smo podatke iz Evropskog 
istraživanja vrednosti (2008). Kao metodu koristili smo regresionu analizu 
– kriterijum: suma najmanjih kvadrata. Zaključci ovog članka upućuju na 
sličnosti između šest država, bivših SFRJ republika, kada je reč o faktorima 
poverenja u institucije. Rezultati istraživanja ukazuju da je ‘zadovoljstvo 
demokratijom’ najpouzdaniji faktor poverenja u institucije na uzorcima svake 
od šest država. Takođe, rezultati ukazuju da teorija o socijalnom kapitalu 
obezbeđuje heuristički plodniji okvir za objašnjavanje poverenja u institucije u 
odnosu na politički pristup.
KLJUČNE REČI: institucije, Evropsko istraživanje vrednosti, socijalno poverenje, 
regresiona analiza, bivša Jugoslavija.
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Conceptual framework
Although there are many theoretical explanations of why confidence in 
institutions (sometimes referred to as political confidence2) varies among 
countries, none predominate and few are empirically testable. One of the most 
prominent approaches is social capital theory (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993), 
in which social trust undergirds confidence in institutions. However, social trust 
itself can be interpreted differently. Why do people trust one another more or 
less? Hardin (1999: 26) argues that social trust can be interpreted as encapsulated 
interest: “By behaving in a particular expected way, because you have an interest 
to do so, your interest encapsulates my interest”. In this interpretation, the issue 
of social trust is about expectations. We “expect” that someone will behave in 
certain manner. However, some authors see a concept of uncertainty (Kramer, 
1999) in this approach, and other authors argue that social trust is, in its essence, 
based on a moral worldview (Mansbridge, 1999). This approach presumes 
that we trust or distrust others because we share the same moral standards. By 
sharing the same moral views, we are interdependent because we expect that 
others will react in the same manner as we would (Newman, 1998; Misztal, 1996; 
Warren, 1999). In a given situation, we transpose our trust in ourselves with trust 
in others. Considering the issue on a broader metaphysical level, some authors 
maintain that social trust is based on religious views, because basic moral and 
social standards come from religion (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Verba, Schlozman, 
& Brady, 1995). On the other hand, Rational choice theory interprets social 
trust as a calculated benefit (Hindmoor, 1998; Warren, 1999) or “risk analysis” 
(Williamson, 1993; 1996).
Returning to the question of political confidence, we assume (as do many 
other authors) that social trust is the basis of confidence in institutions (Newton, 
1999; Brehm & Rahn, 1997) . In this perspective, the main argument comes from 
social capital theory, which claims that the more we trust people we know, the 
more we trust people we do not know. Consequently, the more we trust each 
other, the greater the level of confidence in institutions. In social capital theory 
terminology, particularized trust is the basis of generalized trust (Putnam, 1995; 
Newton, 1999). This approach is not without substantial criticism. Uslaner 
(2002) claims that particularized trust in people we know is different from 
generalized trust in people we do not know. Therefore, trust in people is not 
the same as trusting institutions (Seligman, 1997). Trusting people is something 
personal, while trusting institutions belongs to a public sphere, and it is to a 
great extent influenced by public opinion, particularly mass media (Newton, 
1999). Levi and Stoker (2000) argue that political confidence stems from the 
credibility, competence and transparency of public institutions as they perform 
their duties. Critics also argue that individuals in institutions are obliged to act in 
accordance to law; hence their behavior is not a question of free will and moral 
judgment. From this standpoint, institutions are based on rules, which diminish 
the personal element of political confidence (Offe, 1999; Patterson, 1999).
2 In this paper confidence in institutions and political confidence are going to be used as 
synonyms 
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In this paper, we explain political confidence in the six former republics 
of Yugoslavia, today independent states, through the social capital theory 
thesis: social trust is the basis of confidence in institutions. Accepting this 
main presumption of social capital theory, we examine three additional 
aspects of social trust important for political confidence. First, we contend 
that association membership, civic activism and voluntarism are parts of social 
trust and they influence confidence in institutions (Brehm & Rahn, 1997). It 
is presumed that when individuals join associations, it increases their mutual 
trust and identification with society in general, which leads to higher political 
confidence. However, there is a disagreement among theorists with this 
approach (Hooghe, 2003, Stolle, 2001). Second, we test a “political approach” to 
explaining confidence in institutions. Since political confidence is “political,” it 
is reasonable to assume that political factors would be important in explaining 
confidence; party affiliation and ideology are main factors of confidence in 
institutions (Newton & Norris, 2000). Therefore, individuals would believe that 
if the institutions are in the hands of the cabinet of the party they prefer, they 
will have more confidence in these institutions and vice versa. This concept is 
well-developed and explained in the so-called home team hypothesis (Holmberg, 
1999). Further, this explanation could be particularly strong in transitional 
societies. Former Yugoslav societies are often interpreted as “political societies,” 
or “pre-democratic” societies, with everything in the hands of the ruling party 
(Lazić, M. 2011; Dimitrijević, 2004; Vujadinović, 2008). Laws, regulations and 
institutional independence are jeopardized, and the institutions act primarily for 
the benefit of the ruling party. This tendency in these societies is reinforced by 
two historical factors: the lack of a tradition of rule of law, and a strong tradition 
of authoritarian governance. The main reason  to  comparing six Yugoslav 
republics is because these  countries  have  common history  under the same 
country. The question is what the differences among these countries are after 30 
years of transitions.
Third, we investigate individuals’ satisfaction with life and their attitudes 
toward democracy as possible explanatory factors of political confidence. It is one 
of the most prominent and easily-testable among the many different approaches 
in explaining political confidence. We expect that the more people are satisfied 
with their life and the way democracy develops the more confidence they will 
have in institutions. In many research surveys, satisfaction with democracy 
correlates with tradition of a democratic society (Schmitt, 1983; Kuechler, 
1991; Klingemann, 1999). Therefore, the level of satisfaction with democracy 
is much lower in new democracies than in mature ones (Rimac & Štulhofer, 
2004). However, researchers have different opinions on this argument as well. 
Easton (1965) claims that when estimating satisfaction with democracy, in the 
research environment, individuals actually assess the current performance of the 
government. Therefore satisfaction with democracy, as a variable, should not be 
a reliable predictor of political confidence.
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Data and measurement
We rely on European Value Study (EVS) 2008–2010 data. We accept 
measurements3 provided by this comparative research, with some additional 
statistical adjustments, of course. It is important to note that in this 2008 
particular wave, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia 
were included for the first time; it is the second wave of EVS research for 
Slovenia and Croatia. Therefore, this is the first time it is possible to test certain 
hypothesis in the six countries using the same measurements.
First, in EVS social trust is measured by using three items:
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?
Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or do they 
mostly look after themselves?
Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they 
got a chance or would they try to be fair?
In case of these three questions, the first question is bivalent, while other 
two are 10 point scale. First, we run principal component analysis of these 
three variables (Table 1). As a result, only one factor appears, and reliability of 
measurement is justified.
Table 1 Principal component analysis of social trust
Social trust BIH CRO MNE SER SLO MCD
Most people can be trusted 0.73 0.58 0.69 0.63 0.70 0.75
Most of the time people try to be helpful or 
mostly looking after themselves 0.83 0.77 0.86 0.78 0.73 0.92
Do you think most people try to take 
advantage of you 0.87 0.81 0.86 0.83 0.79 0.91
KMO2 0.64 0.57 0.63 0.59 0.62 0.65
% of variance explained 66 53 65 57 55 74
Eigenvalue 1.98 1.59 1.96 1.71 1.64 2.23
Then, we produced a new variable (scale) measuring social trust by 
collapsing three variables and producing the score ranging from 0 (lowest level of 
trust) to 1 (highest level of trust). In this way, it is possible to analyze dispersion 
of social trust in the six republics by using the same interval criteria (Table 2). It 
could be seen that, according to this measurement, we found the highest level of 
social trust in Slovenia (0.39) and the lowest in Serbia (0.29).
3 There are many different measurements of the concepts we used. The primary differences 
pertain to which specific question is used and what kind of scale is used. Different questions 
and particular scaling may produce different results. For example, the same question that 
is used in EVS about confidence in institutions CID uses an 11-point scale. Still, we use 
measurements introduced by EVS as they are.
2 KMO is Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin measure; it indicates to what extent the variables included in the 
model fit the underlying criteria. The highest possible level of KMO is 1.0 which corresponds 
to excellent fit.
306 SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LVIII (2016), N° 2
Table 2. Level of dispersion of social trust
Country Mean Standard deviation N
Slovenia 0.39 0.24 1365
Montenegro 0.34 0.28 1504
BiH 0.34 0.28 1511
Croatia 0.33 0.23 1523
Macedonia 0.31 0.29 1483
Serbia 0.29 0.23 1508
Confidence in institutions, our main dependent variable, is based on a 
question asking the level of confidence in particular institutions: “Please look 
at this card, and tell me for each item, how much confidence you have in them 
(list of institutions).” Confidence is measured on a four-point scale ranging 
from high level of confidence to no confidence at all. After careful examination 
of the entire list of institutions, and by examining the KMO measure for each 
country, we introduced one-factor principal component analysis which includes 
the following institutions: police, parliament, civil service, social security system, 
government, political parties, health care system and justice system (Table 3)
Table 3. Principal component analysis of confidence in institutions 
Institutions BIH CRO MNE SER SLO MCD
Police .716 .657 .787 .685 .593 .672
Parliament .785 .684 .826 .738 .772 .806
The Civil Services .812 .722 .762 .767 .766 .841
Social Security System .794 .727 .741 .730 .681 .791
Government .714 .761 .769 .761 .714 .688
Political Parties .640 .609 .595 .616 .670 .697
Health Care System .690 .701 .610 .680 .573 .724
Justice System .791 .733 .801 .767 .674 .794
KMO .88 .87 .87 .87 .85 .87
% of variance explained 55 49 55 52 47 57
Eigenvalue 4.44 3.93 4.39 4.14 3.74 4.55
Then, as in the case of social trust, we calculated the score of political 
confidence based on scale from 0 (no confidence) to 1 (the highest confidence). 
Dispersion of the score could be seen in Table 4. Although there are some 
differences in the order of the countries, we still identify the highest level of 
political confidence in Slovenia, while in Serbia it is at the lowest level.
Table 4. Level of dispersion of confidence in institutions
Country Mean Standard Deviation N
Slovenia 0.58 0.13 1362
Macedonia 0.57 0.18 1496
Montenegro 0.55 0.17 1487
BiH 0.53 0.17 1506
Croatia 0.47 0.13 1519
Serbia 0.46 0.14 1501
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Since we presume membership in associations as one of the explanatory 
factors of political confidence, we ran principal component analysis for each 
country, based on their level of membership in associations. As with the case of 
confidence in institutions, a single factor analysis is introduced with attention to 
the KMO test in order to produce valid comparative measurement. Membership 
in organizations is presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Principal component analysis 
of membership in associations
Member/Belong to: BiH CRO MNE SER SLO MCD
Local political actions 0.70 0.57 0.79 0.80 0.72 0.66
Human rights 0.78 0.67 0.88 0.78 0.78 0.17
Conservation, the environment, ecology, 
animal rights 0.65 0.63 0.83 0.67 0.59 0.79
Youth work 0.72 0.40 0.70 0.70 0.47 0.69
Peace movement 0.47 0.64 0.76 0.81 0.71 0.54
KMO 0.74 0.67 0.83 0.81 0.74 0.67
% of variance explained 45 35 63 57 44 37
Eigenvalue 2.26 1.74 3.16 2.84 2.20 1.85
By collapsing the above memberships in a new variable, the score would 
be extremely skewed, since a relatively small number of respondents belong to 
any of these associations. Therefore, we formed a new dummy variable which 
practically indicates whether respondents belong to any of these associations.4 
In Table 6, we present the distribution of this variable in each country.
Table 6. Membership in associations
Country Not a member Member N
BiH 97,6% 2,4% 1512
Croatia 91,8% 8,2% 1374
Montenegro 95,6% 4,4% 1516
Serbia 95,4% 4,6% 1512
Slovenia 89,0% 11,0% 1362
Macedonia 89,6% 10,4% 1499
The highest level of association involvement is measured in Slovenia, but 
in Macedonia it is almost at the same level. While Croatia is in the middle of 
this scale, people in Montenegro and Serbia rarely are members of associations; 
and we measure the lowest level of associational involvement in BiH, where only 
2,4% of respondents report that they are members of any of the above mentioned 
organizations.
Since we presumed that satisfaction with democracy should be a possible 
predictor of political confidence, we introduced this variable in the analysis as 
well. Satisfaction with democracy in EVS is based on a four-point scale question, 
4 Number of those which belong to two or more associations is ridiculously small.
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ranging from “very satisfied” to “not at all satisfied.” We transformed this four-
point scale to provide the scale from 0 (the lowest level) to 1 (the highest level) 
of satisfaction. We present distribution of satisfaction with democracy in each 
country in Table 7.
Table 7. Satisfaction with democracy
Country Mean Standard Deviation N
Slovenia 0.48 0.21 1330
Macedonia 0.43 0.29 1473
Montenegro 0.42 0.27 1418
Croatia 0.36 0.23 1456
BiH 0.34 0.26 1465
Serbia 0.32 0.23 1423
Again, in Slovenia we measure the highest level of satisfaction with 
democracy and in Serbia the lowest level.
Life satisfaction in EVS is measured with a ten-point scale, ranging from 
1 (dissatisfied) to 10 (satisfied). We present dispersion of this variable on the 
original scale for each country in our sample in Table 8.
Table 8. Satisfaction with life
Country Mean Standard Deviation N
Slovenia 7.52 2.11 1364
Montenegro 7.45 2.37 1497
Croatia 7.09 2.39 1514
BiH 7.06 2.34 1496
Serbia 6.94 2.41 1495
Macedonia 6.87 2.47 1445
Data showed that, as with the other variables, we measure the highest 
level of satisfaction with life in Slovenia, while this time Macedonia is at the 
bottom.
The variables that are presented are the once which operationalize social 
capital theory approach in our methodological design. Additionally, as we 
said, we test this so-called “political approach” as well, presuming that specific 
political variables, particularly party preference, would be the main factor of 
confidence in institutions. The main variable for this measure is party affiliation. 
In EVS, party preference is represented through the question: “Which party 
would respondents vote for if the elections took place tomorrow?” We list every 
party with support N=25+ in each country and present them with respective 
EVS codes5 in Table 9.
5 It should be noted that these codes were used as they are in regression analysis tables. Thus, 
when reading the codes in regression tables, each code will refer to the political parties 
presented in Table 9
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Table 9. List of parties and respective EVS codes
BiH CRO MNE SER SLO MCD
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For the purpose of our research, we produced a dummy variable for each 
party in each country, ranging from 1 (would vote) to 0 (wouldn’t vote).
Our second variable for political approach testing is general interest in 
politics. In EVS, interest in politics is measured by a single question with four 
possible responses: very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested and 
not interested at all. For the purpose of our analysis, we produced a dummy 
variable by collapsing very interested and somewhat interested into one category, 
and we combined the other two into a second category. Thus, the dummy 
variable which measures interest in politics has a value of 1 for those who are 
more interested in politics and 0 for those who are less interested in politics. 
Distribution of this variable for each country can be seen in Table 10.
Table 10. Interest in politics
Country Not interested in politics
Interested in 
politics N
BiH 59,6% 40,4% 1512
Croatia 67,3% 32,7% 1525
Montenegro 73,9% 26,1% 1516
Serbia 63,5% 36,5% 1512
Slovenia 55,9% 44,1% 1366
Macedonia 53,7% 46,3% 1500
The most interested in politics, according to the data, are Macedonians and 
Slovenians, and the most uninterested are Montenegrins.
Finally, besides controlling variables which will be explained later, we 
introduced Inglehart’s (1990) measurement of materialism/post-materialism. 
We used an Index based on four well-known items, dividing the sample into 
three categories: materialist, mixed and post-materialist. For the purpose of our 
research, we used post-materialist orientation as a dummy variable. Distribution 
of materialists vs. post-materialists in each country can be seen in Table 11.
310 SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LVIII (2016), N° 2
Table 11. Materialism/Post-Materialism
Country Materialist Post materialist N
BiH 92,6% 7,4% 686
Croatia 76,8% 23,2% 517
Montenegro 86,0% 14,0% 606
Serbia 88,1% 11,9% 705
Slovenia 60,7% 39,3% 460
Macedonia 75,9% 24,1% 593
According to this parameter, Slovenia has comparatively the largest post-
material-oriented population, while in BiH we measure the smallest number of 
respondents belonging to this category.
Factors of political confidence
Our first hypothesis of this research is that social trust, membership in 
associations, satisfaction with democracy and life satisfaction explain political 
confidence. Since we presented theoretical arguments for this approach, as well 
as distribution of variables in question in each country, we test this approach by 
using OLS regression analysis.
Table 12. Correlations between social trust, confidence 
in institutions and satisfaction with democracy
Country
Social trust and 
confidence in 
institutions
Social trust and 
satisfaction with 
democracy
Confidence in institutions 
and satisfaction with 
democracy
Pearson’s r N Pearson’s r N Pearson’s r N
BiH 0.104 1505 0.138 1464 0.268 1463
Croatia 0.075 1517 0.059* 1454 0.340 1453
Montenegro 0.093 1476 0.114 1409 0.505 1401
Serbia 0.123 1497 0.064* 1422 0.303 1415
Slovenia 0.137 1361 0.149 1329 0.338 1328
Macedonia 0.116 1479 0.149 1457 0.492 1471
Entire sample 0.119 8835 0.127 8535 0.412 8531
Each correlation is significant at 0.01 level except those marked with: * which are significant 
at 0.05 level
First, we ran the correlation analysis presented in Table 12. In order to 
provide a multivariate test of the hypothesis, we used OLS regression analysis 
(Table 13). The model is controlled for demographic variables. For gender/sex, 
we used an original dummy variable marking 1 for female. Age of the respondent 
is used in its authentic interval number of years. Also, we used education as 
ISCED one-digit coding scheme. Finally, the size of a town is introduced. 
This variable ranges from 1 (towns smaller than 2000 residents) to 8 (towns 
with more then 500 000 residents). Although it was not an intended matter of 
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interest, demographic variables proved to have some explanatory power. This is 
particularly the case with education, showing the higher the level of education, 
the lower the level of political confidence (the only exception is Serbia). Also, 
in each sample apart from Slovenia, older people tend to have higher political 
confidence than younger ones. Finally, the size of a town seems to be a significant 
negative predictor in each country except in Serbia and Slovenia.
Table 13. Social capital theory testing 
– OLS Beta coefficients of confidence in institutions
PREDICTORS BiH CRO MNE SER SLO MCD
Social trust 0.10*** 0.07** 0.04+ 0.09** 0.11*** 0.06*
Satisfaction with 
democracy 0.23*** 0.32*** 0.49*** 0.28*** 0.33*** 0.47***
Membership in 
associations 0.05* – 0.03 0.02 -0.03 – 0.01 -0.01
Life satisfaction 0.07+ 0.03 0.08*** 0.07** 0.05 0.05+
Size of a town – 0.17*** – 0.18*** – 0.12*** – 0.02 – 0.03 – 0.13***
Female 0.08** 0.00 0.04+ 0.01 -0.03 0.00
Age 0.09** 0.08** 0.05* 0.06* 0.08** – 0.01
Education – 0.07* – 0.06* – 0.07** – 0.04 – 0.06* – 0.09**
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.169 0.289 0.101 0.137 0.267
*** p ≤ 0.001 ** p ≤ 0.01 * p ≤ 0.05 + p ≤ 0.1
Further, we examine social capital theory variables as the most important 
predictors of political confidence. Satisfaction with democracy is the most 
reliable predictor across all samples. In each sample, the value of Beta coefficients 
is much higher than other coefficients, and in each case it is significant with a 
99.9% confidence interval. However, social trust also is a significant predictor 
of political confidence in each country. We observe the most reliable significant 
level in BiH and Slovenia (p<0.001), but it also is highly significant in Croatia and 
Serbia (p<0.01) and in Macedonia (p<0.05). Montenegro is the only country in 
which the significance level of social trust, as a predictor of political confidence, 
can be questioned (p<0.1).
Thus, in general, we may predict that increasing social trust in society 
will produce a higher level of confidence in political institutions. On the other 
hand, membership in associations proved to be a poor predictor of political 
confidence. Apart from BiH, where this variable is significant at a 95% level, in 
all other samples it is insignificant. Finally, the degree of life satisfaction and its 
significance vary from country to country. While satisfaction with life is a highly-
significant predictor in Montenegro and, at lower level, in Serbia, in Macedonia 
and BiH its predictability is questionable. Moreover, we can conclude nothing 
about the level of political confidence based on life satisfaction in Croatia and 
Slovenia.
By observing Adjusted R2 with this model, we can explain 29% of the 
variation in political confidence in Montenegro and 27% in Macedonia. With 
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these predictors, in Croatia we can explain 17% of the variation; in Slovenia 
14%; and in BiH 13%. We can explain the smallest amount of variation with this 
model in Serbia, covering only 10% of variation. However, adjusted R2 includes 
demographic variables. In a model without demographic variables, we found a 
wide percentage of explained variation in each country: BiH 8%; Croatia 12%; 
Montenegro 26%, Serbia 10%, Slovenia 12% and Macedonia 24%. Thus, this is 
the extent in each country to which we can diminish the explanatory power of 
social capital theory variables.
Our second hypothesis is that political confidence can be explained by 
political factors, particularly by party affiliation. In order to test this hypothesis 
we run OLS regression model with “political” variables (Table 14). First, we can 
conclude from Adjusted R2 that predictability of the model containing political 
variables6 is much less useful compared to the social capital theory model. The 
explained variation of political confidence is relatively high only in the case 
of Montenegro (12%). In Slovenia it is 6%, and in all other countries it varies 
between a humble 2% in Macedonia and 4% in BiH. However, in each country, 
at least one party is a highly-significant predictor of political confidence.
Table 14. “Home team” hypothesis testing – OLS: Beta coefficients of 
confidence in institutions
Political parties in respective countries BiH CRO MNE SER SLO MCD
BA(70004); HR(191004); ME(499001); 
RS(688001); SL(705002); MK(807002) 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.30*** 0.16*** 0.09** 0.04
BA(70009); HR(191007); ME(499002); 
RS(688002); SL(705003); MK(807023) 0.13*** – 0.03 0.07** 0.09** 0.08** 0.01
BA(70010); HR(191009); ME(499003); 
RS(688003); SL(705004); MK(807019) 0.10*** 0.08** – 0.06* 0.06* 0.14*** – 0.04
BA(70015); HR(191011); ME(499004); 
RS(688004); SL(705005); MK(807020) 0.00 0.04 – 0.07** 0.04 0.03 0.10***
BA(70030); HR(191013); ME(499005); 
RS(688005); SL(705006) 0.00 – 0.01 – 0.04 0.01 0.18*** -
BA(70038); HR(191016); RS(688015); 
SL(705020) 0.05
+ – 0.02 - 0.05* 0.08** -
BA(70047); SL(705021) 0.09** - - - 0.07** -
SL(705021) - - - - 0.01 -
Interest in politics 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.08** 0.10*** 0.10**
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.029 0.115 0.035 0.063 0.022
*** p ≤ 0.001. ** p ≤ 0.01. * p ≤ 0.05. + p ≤ 0.1
It is interesting that in Macedonia, the Party of Ethnic Albanians (DUI) is 
the only significant political party. Additionally, Montenegro, has had a stable 
ruling structure led by the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) since the 
beginning of the country’s transition, and it is logical that preferring this party 
would be highly-significant for political confidence. This model fits the best 
in Montenegro compared to other countries probably because of the country’s 
6 We will use term “home-team” hypothesis (Holmberg, 1999) as a synonym of political approach
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transitional exceptionalism, in which there has been no change of the ruling 
party since the fall of socialism. In Montenegro, the model is “clean”: when 
preferring two parties which are in power (DPS and SDP), the Beta coefficient 
is positive and the political confidence predictor of preferring the two main 
opposition parties (SNS7 and PZP) is negative. The only insignificant party in 
this regard is SNP, but this party emerged from the ruling DPS after the DPS 
dissolved in 1997. In Slovenia, as well as in Serbia, it is interesting that both 
the ruling and opposition parties are significant positive predictors of political 
confidence. However, it must be said, this finding further undermines the 
“home-team” hypothesis, since support for the ruling parties, and not opposition 
parties, should connote a higher level of political confidence. This hypothesis 
is supported, apart from the case of Montenegro, in BiH and Croatia. Finally, 
interest in politics is a significant predictor in Serbia, Slovenia and Macedonia, 
but this predictor is not significant at all in the other three countries.
Our final model is presented in Table 15. It is a comprehensive model which 
includes the entire set of variables from both of the above proposed models8. 
We introduce this model primarily to estimate the strength of predictors in a 
multivariate environment where each independent variable is controlled by 
other independent variables. First, if we analyze the differences between adjusted 
R2 in the social capital theory model and the final model, we see that we did not 
gain many explained variations by adding the full range of political variables. In 
the final model, compared to the social capital theory model, the percentage of 
explained variation increases only by 1% to 2%, depending on the country.
In the final model, satisfaction with democracy is the strongest and the most 
reliable predictor. According to our analysis, only one in one thousand samples 
may show different results, which is a very impressive certainty of the finding. 
Additionally, the value of Beta coefficients of this predictor is much higher than 
any other predictor9. Thus, our main and most reliable finding is that the more 
people are satisfied with democracy, the more likely they are to have confidence in 
institutions. However, this finding also raises possible problems with the question 
used in the survey. As mentioned above, it is not clear whether satisfaction 
with democracy measures real perception of democratic development in a 
society, or whether it represents an assessment of the current performance of 
the government. Future research should include variables or scales measuring 
democratic value orientation. This would ensure that the satisfaction with 
democracy measure is not merely demonstrating a preference for the current 
democratic political system in general.
7 Today called NOVA (New Serbian Democracy), at the time of research (2008) SNS (Serbian 
People’s party)
8 We disregard the argument that many predictors would produce the situation that some of 
the coefficients are significant by chance because in the table we presented six models at one 
place (one in each country). The maximum number of predictors, therefore, is in Slovenia 
(18 of them)
9 We stress that standardized Beta coefficients are presented in the table. 
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Table 15. Final model – OLS: 
Beta coefficients of confidence in institutions
PREDICTORS BiH CRO MNE SER SLO MCD
Social trust 0.10*** 0.08** 0.04+ 0.09** 0.10*** 0.06*
Satisfaction with democracy 0.20*** 0.31*** 0.42*** 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.46***
Membership in associations 0.05* -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 – 0.02 0.01
Life satisfaction 0.08** 0.02 0.07** 0.07** 0.04 0.05+
Size of town – 0.15*** – 0.18*** – 0.10*** – 0.03 – 0.03 – 0.13***
Sex 0.08** 0.00 0.04+ 0.02 -0.02 0.02
Age 0.09** 0.08** 0.03 0.05 0.05+ – 0.01




















-0.04 – 0.02 – 0.03 -0.01 0.12*** -
BA(70038); HR(191016); 
RS(688015); SL(705020) 0.02 – 0.02 - 0.06* 0.05
+ -
BA(70047); SL(705021) 0.05+ - - - 0.06* -
SL(705021) - - - - 0.00
Interest in politics 0.04 – 0.01 0.03 0.05+ 0.05+ 0.03
Post –materialist – 0.06** – 0.02 – 0.06* 0.02 – 0.00 – 0.06**
Adjusted R2 0.149 0.178 0.310 0.119 0.159 0.274
*** p ≤ 0.001. ** p ≤ 0.01. * p ≤ 0.05. + p ≤ 0.1
Although social trust, our main social capital theory variable, varies among 
countries, it is still a significant predictor of confidence in institutions in each 
sample. As in the basic model, however, social trust is the most unreliable 
predictor of institutional confidence in Montenegro, where one out of ten possible 
samples could provide different results compared to the one we found in this 
sample. However, in all other countries, we can rely on social trust as a stable 
predictor of political confidence. Therefore, we say with reasonable probability 
that interpersonal social trust increases political confidence in the six former Yugoslav 
republics. However, association membership is not a useful predictor in either the 
basic model or the final model. Only in BiH is this variable significant (p<0.05).
Although the whole set of political variables does not explain much variation 
of political confidence, many of them remain significant and useful predictors in 
the final model. First, party affiliation – as the main variable which supports 
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the “home-team” hypothesis – plays different roles in different countries. In 
Slovenia, preference of six out of eight political parties is a significant predictor 
of political confidence, albeit with varying significance levels. Most interesting, 
each predictor of this kind in Slovenia is positive, and it includes both the ruling 
and opposition parties. We found a similar pattern in Serbia, where five out of six 
parties are significant predictors (with different levels of significance). However, 
as in Slovenia, each predictor is positive, and the parties in question are both 
opposition and ruling parties. Hence, in these two states, though party affiliation 
somewhat explains political confidence, the finding does not align with a “home-
team” hypothesis, which claims supporters of the ruling party will have higher 
confidence in institutions. It seems that in these two countries, supporting either 
the ruling or opposition parties increases political confidence.
In BiH, four out of seven parties are significant positive predictors, but in 
this case the “home-team” hypothesis is somewhat supported: all four are ruling 
parties in respective Bosnian entities. In Montenegro and Croatia as well, the 
“home-team” hypothesis showed some potential. In Croatia, indeed, those who 
support the ruling HDZ10 party tend to have more confidence in institutions 
compared to those who do not support this party. In Montenegro, we see even 
clearer picture: positive predictability of the ruling party is followed by negative 
predictability of the main opposition party. Therefore, in these three countries, 
the “home-team” hypothesis has some empirical support, but with limited 
explanatory power.
In Macedonia, only preference for the Ethnic Albanian Party is a useful 
predictor in the final model. This finding is odd and it demands additional 
analysis. We know that ethnic Albanians earnestly challenge the legitimacy of the 
Macedonian state, and it does not follow logically that preferring the Albanian 
party in Macedonia increases the likelihood of institutional confidence.
Interest in politics in the final model appears not to be a useful predictor 
of political confidence. This variable showed some potential only in Serbia and 
Slovenia, but at a p<0.1 confidence interval. Thus, we may conclude that a higher 
level of interest in politics does not increase the level of political confidence.
Finally, we included post-materialism as a dummy variable in our 
comprehensive model, primarily to control other variables with value orientations. 
This variable has some explanatory potential for political confidence as a 
negative predictor in BiH, Montenegro and Macedonia, but it is not significant 
in the other three countries.
Final conclusions and recap
We tested two theories with respective hypotheses, trying to illuminate 
to what extent social capital and political factors could explain confidence in 
institutions in the six former Yugoslav republics. We found that, in general, 
social capital theory is a more useful predictor in each country. Political factors 
have much less explanatory power, though we cannot disregard them.
10 It was the ruling party at the time i.e. 2008
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Among all the concepts we used to test our hypothesis, satisfaction with 
democracy is the most reliable predictor. In each of the six former Yugoslav 
republics, the more people are satisfied with democracy, the more they tend 
to have confidence in institutions. This finding raises some theoretical and 
empirical questions. Empirically, it spurs doubts about the measurement used 
in this particular research, which we have addressed above. Theoretically, the 
main question remains: what does satisfaction with democracy really measure? 
Bearing in mind the predictive power of satisfaction with democracy as a factor of 
political confidence, future research should examine three things. First, it should 
provide additional measurements for satisfaction with democracy. Second, it 
should control this measurement with other variables, such as the preference for 
the political system in general and preference for democracy in general, as well 
as including some wider value orientations. Third, future research should test 
the hypothesis at an aggregate level in addition to an individual one.
From the social capital theory point of view, the most important conclusion 
we can draw is that confidence in political institutions most probably increases 
if people trust each other more. We confirm this finding in each country 
sample. This justification of social trust as a predictor of political confidence 
can contribute to many research surveys with a similar topical focus but reach 
different – and even opposite – conclusions based on alternate empirical material 
and statistical analyses.
However, in each state we examined, association membership does not 
contribute to higher political confidence. It simply is not the case that the 
more people join different associations, the more they have confidence in the 
institutions of the state. This finding confirms many previous research surveys 
which reach the same conclusion. It might be that joining an organization is not 
connected with social trust, but the origins of motive for joining could be quite 
individual and vary from country to country. Still, it should be noted that Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is an exceptional case in this regard, compared to the other 
five countries. This finding may be explained by BiH’s complex state structure, 
lack of political legitimacy, generally unstable social structure and its status as an 
international protectorate. Perhaps Bosnian people join associations searching 
for something to ameliorate the loss of social order in daily life.
Beside the fact that the political factors approach has limited explanatory 
power in general, from a comparative perspective, we identify differences among 
countries. First, in BiH, Croatia and, particularly, Montenegro, confidence in 
institutions correlates positively with preferring the ruling parties. However, in 
Serbia and Slovenia, we could expect higher political confidence by individuals 
supporting both the opposition and ruling parties. Perhaps political participation 
in general is a leading factor in these two countries. This could be examined in 
future surveys by introducing two mechanisms of control: conventional political 
participation as a variable, and a variable measuring to what extent citizens are 
politically informed. We assume that party affiliation only represents political 
participation and being politically informed. However, this should not be due to 
interest in politics because we controlled our model with this variable.
Miloš Bešić: Confi dence in Institutions in Former Yugoslav Republics 317
References
Brehm, J. and W. Rahn (1997). Individual-level evidence for the causes and 
consequences of social capital. American Journal of Political Science 41 (3): 
999–1023.
Coleman, J. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Dimitrijević, N. (2004). Srbija kao nedovršena država. na.
Easton, D. (1965). A Systems Analysis of Political Life. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Hardin, R. (1999). Do we want trust in government. In M.E. Warren (ed.), 
Democracy and Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hindmoor, A. (1998). The importance of being trusted: Transaction costs and 
policy network theory. Public Administration, 76: 25–43.
Holmberg, S. (1999). Down and down we go: political trust in Sweden. In P. 
Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Government, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 103–22.
Hooghe, M. (2003). Voluntary associations and democratic attitudes: value 
congruence as a causal mechanism. In M. Hooghe and D. Stolle (eds.), 
Generating Social Capital: Civil Society and Institutions in Comparative 
Perspective. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Klingemann, H. (1999). Mapping political support in the 1990s: a global 
analysis. In P. Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic 
Government, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 31–56.
Kramer, R. M. (1999). Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, 
enduring questions. American Review of Psychology, 50: 569–598
Kuechler, M. (1991). The dynamics of mass political support in western Europe: 
methodological problems and preliminary findings. In K. Reif and R. 
Inglehart (eds.), Eurobarometer: The Dynamics of European Public Opinion, 
London: Macmillan.
Lazić, M. (2011). Postsocijalistička transformacija i restratifikacija u Srbiji.
Politička misao, 48(3), 123–14
Levi, M. and L. Stoker (2000). Political trust and trustworthiness. Annual Review 
of Political Science, 3: 475–508.
Mansbridge, J. (1999). Altruistic trust. In M.E. Warren (ed.), Democracy and 
Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Misztal, B.A. (1996). Trust in Modern Societies. Oxford: Blackwell
Newman, J. (1998). The dynamics of trust. In A. Coulson (ed.), Trust and 
Contracts: Relationships in local government, health and public services. Bristol: 
The Polity Press.
Newton, K. (1999). Social capital and democracy in modern Europe. In J. van 
Deth, M. Maraffi, K. Newton, and P. Whiteley (eds.), Social Capital and 
European Democracy, London: Routledge, pp. 3–24.
318 SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LVIII (2016), N° 2
Newton, K. and P. Norris, (2000). Confidence in public institutions: faith, 
culture, or performance? In S. Pharr and R. D. Putnam (eds.), Disaffected 
Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries? Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, pp. 52–73.
Offe, C. (1999). How can we trust our fellow citizens. In M.E. Warren (ed.), 
Democracy and Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Patterson, O. (1999). Liberty against the democratic state: On the historical 
and contemporary sources of American distrust. In M. E. Warren (ed.), 
Democracy and Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Putnam, R. D. (1995). Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital. Journal 
of Democracy 6: 65–78.
Rimac, I. and A. Štulhofer (2004). Sociokulturne vrijednosti, gospodarska 
razvijenost i politička stabilnost kao čimbenici povjerenja u Europsku Uniju. 
In K. Ott, Pridruživanje Hrvatske Europskoj Uniji – Izazovi institucionalnih 
prilagodbi. Zagreb: Institut za javne finansije, Zaklada Friedrich Ebert.
Schmitt, H. (1983). Party government in public opinion: a European crossnational 
comparison. European Journal of Political Research 11: 353–75.
Seligman, A. B. (1997). The Problem of Trust. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.
Stolle, D. (2001). Getting to trust: an analysis of the importance of institutions, 
families, personal experiences, and group membership. In P. Dekker and E. 
M. Uslaner (eds.), Social Capital and Participation in Everyday Life. London: 
Routledge.
Uslaner, E. M. (2002). The Moral Foundations of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Verba, S., K. L. Schlozman, and H. Brady (1995). Voice and Equality: Civic 
Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vujadinović, D. (2008). Civilno društvo i politička kultura. Filozofska istraživanja, 
28(1), 21–33.
Warren, M. E. (1999). Democratic theory and trust. In M.E. Warren (ed.), 
Democracy and Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1993). Calculativeness, trust and economic organisation. 
Organisational behaivour and industrial relations. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 36(4): 453–486.
Williamson, O. E. (1996). The mechanisms of governance. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
